Do Former Leaders Have an International Right to Self-Representation in War Crimes Trials? by Scharf, Michael P. & Rassi, Christopher M.
Do Former Leaders Have an International Right
to Self-Representation in War Crimes Trials?
MICHAEL P. SCHARF* & CHRISTOPHER M. RASSI**
I. INTRODUCTION
Picture what would happen if former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein
sought to represent himself at his war crimes trial before the Iraqi Special
Tribunal. While doing so, assume that the judge presiding over his case
decided to follow the precedent of the Trial Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that tried the case of
Slobodan Milogevid, which held: "[U]nder customary international law, the
defendant has a right to counsel, but he also has a right not to have counsel."'
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I Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No.: IT-99-37-PT, Transcript, Aug. 30, 2001, at 18
("Status Conference").
We have to act in accordance with the Statute and our Rules which, in any
event, reflect the position under customary international law, which is that the
[defendant] has a right to counsel, but he also has a right not to have counsel. He has
a right to defend himself, and it is quite clear that he has chosen to defend himself.
He has made that abundantly clear. The strategy that the Chamber has employed of
appointing an amicus curiae will take care of the problems that you have outlined,
but I stress that it would be wrong for the Chamber to impose counsel on the
[defendant], because that would be in breach of the position under customary
international law.
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One does not need the imagination of a Jules Verne to be able to glimpse the
perilous consequences. Indeed, the Milogevid trial itself, now in its third year,
provides a step-by-step blueprint for what would likely ensue.
As a result of the decision of the MiloMevi Trial Chamber to allow the
defendant to act as his own attorney in the courtroom, the former Serb leader
has been able to generate the illusion that he was a solitary individual pitted
against an army of foreign lawyers and investigators. Day after day he sits
alone in the courtroom behind a row of conspicuously empty desks that
would ordinarily be occupied by the defense team. In reality, Milogevid has
had a squadron of legal counsel assisting him from behind the scenes,
including some of the world's most distinguished trial attorneys. Under their
direction, lawyers and supporters of Milogevid dig up files and background
on witnesses who are about to appear in court, enabling Milogevi6 to become
the Serb "Abe Lincoln." 2
An even more significant ramification of the Trial Chamber's ruling is
that it has given Milogevi6 the chance to make unfettered speeches
throughout the trial. In contrast, a defendant is ordinarily able to address the
court only when he takes the stand to give testimony during the defense's
case-in-chief, and in the usual case, the defendant is limited to giving
evidence that is relevant to the charges, and he is subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution. By acting as his own counsel, Milogevi6 has
been able to begin each stage of the trial with hours of opening arguments,
which have included Hollywood-quality video and slide-show presentations
showing the destruction wrought by the 1999 NATO-bombing campaign. 3
Bending over backward to maintain the appearance of fairness, the Trial
Chamber has permitted Milogevid to treat the witnesses, prosecutors, and
themselves in a manner that would earn ordinary defense counsel expulsion
Id.
As this article was in editing stages, the MilogeviW Trial Chamber reversed itself,
ruling on September 2, 2004, that Milogevid had to act through counsel for the remainder
of the trial. Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No.: IT-99-37-PT, Transcript, Sept. 2, 2004, at
32391. A written Order followed on September 3, 2004. Prosecutor v. Milogevik, Case
No.: IT-99-37-PT, Order on the Modalities to be Followed by Court Assigned Counsel,
Sept. 3, 2004, at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/040903.htm (last visited
Oct. 10, 2004). The Trial Chamber's decision was certified for interlocutory appeal on
Sept. 10, 2004. Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No.: IT-99-37-PT, Order on Request for
Certification to Appeal the Decision on the Trial Chamber on Court Assigned Counsel,
Sept. 10, 2004, at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/040910.htm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2004).
2 Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milogevi6 Trial, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 915,
918 (2003).
3 Id. at 918-19.
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from the courtroom. In addition to regularly making disparaging remarks
about the court and repeatedly browbeating witnesses, Milogevid pontificates
at length during cross-examination of every prosecution witness.4 Summing
up the impact of Milogevi6's trial performance, one former employee of the
Tribunal stated: "You can't help falling under his spell. He's very sharp and
he's funny. It's sick, I know, given what he's there for, but he's so cynical
and quick that he's had the courtroom in fits of laughter at times."'5
While Milogevid's defense strategy is unlikely to win him an acquittal, it
has been described by a Balkans expert as "brilliantly cunning, designed to
play on Serbia's psychological vulnerabilities and continued Serb resentment
of the 1999 NATO bombing." 6 To the extent that it is aimed not at the court
of law, but the court of public opinion back home in Serbia, Milogevi6's
strategy is unquestionably paying off. His approval rating in Serbia doubled
4 Id. at 919.
5 Id. at 930 n.83 (citing Marc Champion, Court of Opinion: With Hague Case,
Defiant Milofevie Wins at Home 'All Alone against the World', WALL ST. J., Jan. 10,
2003, at A-1). The decision to permit Milogevid to serve as his own lawyer has also
affected the pace and duration of the proceedings. Because of concerns about Milogevid's
high blood pressure and heart condition, the trial (now in its third year) only takes place
three times a week as opposed to the standard five, and the amount of hours per day has
been reduced from eight to four. Scharf, supra note 2, at 917. As a result, the trial has
lasted much longer than originally envisioned, and the prosecution has been ordered to
reduce the number of its witnesses in an effort to speed up the proceedings. At the end of
the prosecution's case in chief, Milogevid requested a continuance of over two years,
blaming the fact that he is conducting his own defense, the complexity of the case, the
large number of witnesses he anticipated to present, and the extensive material disclosed
by the prosecution which he must examine. See Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No.: IT-
02-54-T, July 2, 3003 ("Scheduling Order for a Status Conference"); Prosecutor v.
Milogevid, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, Transcript, Sept. 2, 2003 ("Status Conference"). While
not granting the full extent of his request, the Milogevid Trial Chamber was quite lenient
and granted him an adjournment of three months to prepare his defense. Prosecutor v.
Milogevid, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, Sept. 17, 2003 ("Order Concerning the Preparation and
Presentation of the Defence Case"). During the adjournment, one of the three presiding
judges, Sir Richard May of the United Kingdom, was forced to resign for health reasons,
and Milogevid has argued that the trial should begin anew because of the addition of a
new judge. Judge May died July 1, 2004. See Marlise Simons, Richard May, Milofevi6
Judge, Dies at 65, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 2004, at A17.
6 Scharf, supra note 2, at 930 n.84 (citing Dusko Doder, Book Review of Slobodan
Milofevi6 and the Destruction of Yugoslavia by Louis Sell, THE NATION, May 27, 2002,
at 25).
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during the first weeks of his trial.7 A recent poll found that 39% of the Serb
population rated Milogevid's trial performance "superior," while less than
25% felt that he was getting a fair trial, and only 33% thought that he was
actually responsible for war crimes.8 Milogevi has gone from the most
reviled individual in Serbia to number four on the list of most admired Serbs,
and in December 2003, Milogevi6 easily won a seat in the Serb parliament in
a nation-wide election. 9 "You really have two trials going on at the same
time, one in the court and the other in the forum of public opinion," observes
Judith Armatta, an American lawyer who monitors the trial for the coalition
for International Justice, a non-profit organization that supports international
efforts to bring war criminals to justice. "You may get two very different
results."' 0
What if Saddam Hussein were permitted to do the same thing at his trial?
The thought-of Saddam Hussein appearing on the nightly news throughout
the Middle East, riling against the illegal U.S. invasion of Iraq, insisting that
the United States was complicit in Iraqi war crimes against Iran, and
encouraging his followers to commit acts of violence against the United
States, is indeed frightening, especially given the stakes involved.
As with trials of other former rogue leaders around the world, the trial of
Saddam Hussein could potentially serve several important functions in the
transition to democracy and the rule of law in Iraq."I First, by pinning prime
responsibility on Saddam Hussein and other top Ba'ath figures, and
disclosing the way the Iraqi armed forces and security services were
compelled to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes
against foreign nationals and Iraqi citizens alike, the trial would facilitate
national reconciliation. While this would not completely absolve the
7 Id. at 930 n.85 (citing Andre Purvis, Star Power in Serbia; Slobodan Milofevi6's
Performance at his War Crimes Trial has Won Him Increased Popularity at Home, TIME
(EUROPE), Sept. 30, 2002, at 46).
8 Id. at 930 n.83 (citing Joseph Lelyveld, The Defendant; Slobodan Milogevi6's
Trial, and the Debate Surrounding International Courts, THE NEW YORKER, May 27,
2002, at 82; CNN International: Q&A with Zaine Verjee, Early Afternoon (CNN
broadcast transcript, Feb. 12, 2002)).
9 Dosan Stojanovic, Milogevi6 Wins Serb Parliament Seat, THE PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Dec. 30, 2003, at A9.
10 Scharf, supra note 2, at 931 n.83 (citing Champion, supra note 5).
11 For a detailed discussion of the roles of justice in the aftermath of conflict, see
PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? 11-22 (2002). In the
context of rebuilding Iraq, see Michael P. Scharf, Is It International Enough? A Critique
of the Iraqi Special Tribunal in Light of the Goals of International Justice, 2 J. OF INT'L.
CRIM. JUST. 330, 331 (2004).
[Vol. 20:1 20051
FORMER LEADERS
thousands of underlings for their acts, 12 it would make it easier for the
northern Kurds and southern Marsh Arabs (Shi'ites) to agree to remain in a
unified Iraq and participate in a national government made up of Kurds,
Shi'ites, and Sunnis. This would also promote a political catharsis in Iraq,
enabling the newly elected leaders to distance themselves from the
discredited repressive and bellicose policies of the past. Second, the historic
record generated from the trial would educate the Iraqi people, who were
long misled by Saddam Hussein's propaganda, about the acts of aggression,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed by the Ba'ath regime.
Documenting the mass scale of these atrocities with credible evidence by a
court perceived as fair would also help vindicate the American invasion and
diminish support for opposition groups which continue to wage a guerilla
war against U.S. and other foreign troops and officials stationed in Iraq.
Third, the trial could send an important signal that the new Iraq will be based
on principles of justice, fairness, human rights, and the rule of law. Fourth,
the trial would act as a model for how other countries can deal with
accountability for past atrocities after emerging from repression.
To achieve these objectives, however, the trial of Saddam Hussein must
be perceived by the Iraqi people and those around the Middle East as
legitimate and fair. If, in contrast, Saddam Hussein were to be permitted to
take advantage of the tactics of Slobadan Milogevid and portray his trial as
"victor's justice" at the hands of a "puppet court," this would seriously
undermine the goal of fostering reconciliation between the Iraqi Kurds,
Shi'ites, and Sunnis. The historic record developed by such a trial would
forever be questioned. And the trial would transform Saddam Hussein and
his cronies into martyrs, fueling violent opposition to the United States and
the new Iraqi government.13
Given these grave implications, we must ask whether the Milogevi6 Trial
Chamber was correct in its conclusion that former leaders have an
12 It is estimated that there were over 50,000 "full members" of the Ba'ath party in
Iraq. Special Report: Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq, SPECIAL REPORT 104 (United
States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C.), Apr. 2003, at 8.
13 For a detailed analysis of other problems concerning the Iraqi Special Tribunal,
see generally Jose Alverez, Trying Hussein: Between Hubris and Hegemony, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 319 (2004); Claus Kress, The Iraqi Special Tribunal and the Crime of
Aggression, 2 J INT'L CRIM. JUST. 347 (2004) (in the context of rebuilding Iraq); Scharf,
supra note 11, at 338; Yuval Shany, Does One Size Fit All? Reading the Jurisdictional
Provisions of the New Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute in the Light of the Statutes of
International Criminal Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 338 (2004); and Danilo Zolo,
The Iraqi Special Tribunal Back to the Nuremburg Paradigm?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 313
(2004).
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international right to act as their own lawyer in war crimes trials. Although
common law/adversarial countries generally permit a defendant to decline
appointed counsel and represent himself if he is determined to be of sound
mind, this article demonstrates that the right to argue one's own case in court
(rather than to act through a lawyer) is not a fundamental right enshrined in
international law.
To this end, the article begins in Part II by critically examining the Trial
Chamber decision in Prosecutor v. Milogevi614 and the justifications used for
finding that Milogevid is entitled to represent himself. In this context, this
section explores the drafting history and scholarly commentary related to
Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which provides that the defendant has the right "to defend himself
in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing."' 5 This inquiry
demonstrates that the underlying purpose of the defendant's Article 14(3)(d)
right is to ensure a fair trial, an objective that can be met through assignment
of a qualified attorney who is vigilantly committed to representing his
client's interests. Next, it analyzes the jurisprudence of the Human Rights
Committee and the regional human rights institutions that are cited in the
Miloevk decision, and demonstrates that the MilogeviW decision was not in
fact compelled by this body of precedent.
In Part III, the article explores the two main reasons why a court in a
major war crimes trial should be able to require the defendant to work
through counsel. First, it examines the likelihood that a defendant will act in
a disruptive manner. Such seems to be inherent in certain types of
defendants, in particular former rogue leaders who publicly challenge the
court's authority to try them, thereby warranting appointment of counsel. It
then focuses on the complexity of the case as a determining factor. Cases
involving former rogue leaders accused of war crimes are particularly
intricate. The concept of "equality of arms" and the unique need in these
cases for an orderly trial to facilitate the peace and reconciliation process
further militate against a right to self-representation in war crimes trials.
Finally, in Part IV, the article analyzes the relevant post-Miloevi6
decisions from the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). These recent
14 Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No.: IT-02-54, Apr. 4, 2003 ("Reasons for Decision
on the Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel"), at
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/040403.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2004) [hereinafter Milogevid Reasoned Decision].
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1996, art. 14 (3)(d),
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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decisions represent a novel compromise; namely, allowing the defendant to
represent himself, but appointing a standby defense counsel ready to step in
if the defendant gets too disruptive or the case gets too complex. While
potentially an improvement over the Milolevi6 approach, this new approach
also has its problems, stemming from the requirement of a specific showing
of disruptiveness or complexity before the court will turn the case over to the
defense counsel. Waiting until the defendant actually disrupts the trial before
turning the proceedings over to counsel will often be too late.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE CONTROVERSY
A. Representing MilogeviW
The two ad hoc international tribunals created by the United Nations
Security Council, the ICTY and ICTR, have sought to maintain the highest
standards of prosecution of defendants by ensuring fair trials. The designers
of the defense systems in the respective tribunals considered one of the most
important aspects of a fair trial to be a credible defense of the defendant. For
example, at both tribunals, the defendant may engage a lawyer at his own
expense, but an indigent defendant will be assigned counsel for his defense at
the expense of the tribunals.1 6
When Slobodan Milogevid first appeared before the Trial Chamber (the
Milogevi6 Trial Chamber) as a defendant in 2001, he formally declined to
appoint a lawyer for his defense, or to accept the assignment of a lawyer by
the ICTY. 17 Eventually, the ICTY felt compelled to appoint three
distinguished lawyers as amici curiae (friends of the court) to assist the
ICTY, but not to represent Milogevi6 directly.' 8 Over the years, the
prosecution team in the case, concerned that Milogevi6 would struggle to
defend himself in such a complex matter, repeatedly suggested that the
Milogevi6 Trial Chamber should assign defense counsel to Milogevi& The
Trial Chamber repeatedly rejected the proposal as far back as August 30,
2001, stating that "under customary international law, the defendant has a
16See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOsLAVIA 230-36 (1995);
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA 512-16, 520-29 (1998).
17 Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No.: IT-99-37-I, July 3, 2001, at 1-2, ("Initial
Appearance"), at http:llwww.Milosevic-trial.org/trial/2001-07-03.htm (last visited Oct.
10,2004).
18 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF & WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, SLOBODAN MILO EVI6 ON
TRIAL: A COMPANION 78-79 (2002).
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right to counsel, but he also has a right not to have counsel." 19 On November
8, 2002, the prosecution again sought the appointment of defense counsel for
Milogevid, 20 only to have it rejected once more by the Trial Chamber.2
However, no detailed analysis for this "protected right" was made
available by the Trial Chamber until the so-called "reasoned decision" of
April 3, 2003, where it rejected for a third time the motion by the prosecution
to have defense counsel imposed on Milogevi6.2 2 The decision was based on
an interpretation of Article 21 of the ICTY Statute, which incorporates the
language of Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR. The Trial Chamber concluded
that the "plain meaning" of Article 21(4)(d) does not "allow for the
assignment of defense counsel for the [defendant] against his wishes in the
present circumstances." 2 3 For further authority, the Miloevi Trial Chamber
examined recognition of this "protected right" in national jurisdictions, in
particular the United States. It noted that the U.S. Supreme Court in 1975 had
held that the state could not constitutionally force a lawyer upon a defendant
if he is literate, competent, and understanding, and voluntarily exercises his
informed free will. 24 It is noteworthy that the Trial Chamber did not see fit to
19 Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No.: IT-99-37-PT, Transcript, Aug. 30, 2001, at 18
("Status Conference").
We have to act in accordance with the Statute and our Rules which, in any
event, reflect the position under customary international law, which is that the
[defendant] has a right to counsel, but he also has a right not to have counsel. He has
a right to defend himself, and it is quite clear that he has chosen to defend himself.
He has made that abundantly clear. The strategy that the Chamber has employed of
appointing an amicus curiae will take care of the problems that you have outlined,
but I stress that it would be wrong for the Chamber to impose counsel on the
[defendant], because that would be in breach of the position under customary
international law.
Id.
20 Milogevi6 Reasoned Decision, supra note 14, at para. 10 (referring to
"Submission of the Office of the Prosecutor on the Future Conduct of the Case in the
Light of the State of the [defendantl's Health and the Length and Complexity of the
Case," Nov. 8, 2002).
21 Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No.: IT-02-54, Transcript, Dec. 18, 2002, at 14574,
available at http://www.un.org./icty/transe54/021218IT.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
"[D]efence [sic] counsel will not be imposed upon the [defendant] against his wishes in
the present circumstances. It is not normally appropriate in adversarial proceedings such
as these. The Trial Chamber will keep the position under review." Id.
22 Id.
23 Milogevi6 Reasoned Decision, supra note 14, at para. 18.
24 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975). The Supreme Court held that
the state could not constitutionally force a lawyer upon a defendant if he is literate,
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follow the practice of the civil law countries, which do not recognize a right
to self-representation. The bulk of the Trial Chamber's reasoning centered on
the text of the ICCPR and the regional human rights conventions, as well as
the dicta of several human rights institutions. Yet, upon closer examination,
none of the conventions or decisions relied upon by the Trial Chamber
support the view that an international court cannot force a defendant of sound
mind to forego the option of representing himself.
B. Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR
It is helpful to examine the drafting history of Article 14(3)(d) of the
ICCPR in order to locate the origins of the provision and its true meaning.
The United States provided the first substantive contributions to the First
Session of the Drafting Committee of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Declaration), held from June 9-25, 1947. These provisions later
became part of Article 14 of the ICCPR, but were originally aimed to be
included in the proposed Articles 6 and 27 of the Declaration. It is
noteworthy that the initial proposal for Article 14 of the ICCPR included
only the right to consult with and be represented by counsel; there was no
mention of a right to self-representation. 25 At the Second Session of the
Drafting Committee, the United States introduced a revised draft Article,
competent, and understanding, and voluntarily exercises his informed free will. The
defendant initially represented himself against state charges of grand theft, but after the
trial judge determined that the defendant had not intelligently and knowingly waived his
right to counsel, he appointed a public defender, ruling that the defendant had no
constitutional right to conduct his own defense. Id. at 806-10.
25 See DAVID WEISSBRODT, THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 43-45 (2001). Weissbrodt quotes Comments on the Secretariat
Outline, at 1, art. 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/8 (1947) as follows:
No one shall be deprived of life or personal liberty, or be convicted or punished for
crime in any manner, save by judgment of a competent and impartial tribunal, in
conformity with law, after a fair and public trial at which he has had the opportunity
for a full hearing, the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, the right
of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and the right to consult
with and be represented by counsel.
Id. at 44-45.
Further, according to Comments on the Secretariat Outline, at 5, art. 27, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.1/8 (1947), "[elvery person has the right to have any civil claims or liabilities
determined without undue delay by a competent and impartial tribunal before which he
has the opportunity for a fair hearing, and has the right to consult with and be represented
by counsel." Id. at 45
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which provided that everyone is entitled to the aid of counsel. 26 It was not
until the draft wording at the end of the Committee's Fifth Session that the
eventual Article 14 of the ICCPR added that, in the determination of any
criminal charge, one is entitled "[t]o defend himself in person or through
legal assistance which shall include the right to legal assistance of his own
choosing, or, if he does not have such, to be informed of his right and, if
unobtainable by him, to have legal assistance assigned. 27
At the Sixth Session, the United States stressed that, in its legal system,
the defendant has the right to refuse the assigned counsel and ask for another
if the assigned counsel does not perform properly. According to the official
records, no discussion ensued concerning an absolute right to represent
oneself; rather the delegates were solely concerned about the right to access
counsel, the choice of counsel, and who pays for counsel if the defendant is
indigent.28 This evinces the limited weight the drafters placed on the wording
which the Milogevi6 Trial Chamber has interpreted as creating a right to self-
representation.
It is noteworthy that distinguished scholars in the field have not read this
clause as requiring a right of self-representation. According to Professor
Cherif Bassiouni, "the right to self-representation complements the right to
counsel and is not meant as a substitute thereof." 29 The purpose of the right
to self-representation is to assure "the accused of the right to participate in
his or her defense, including directing the defense, rejecting appointed
counsel, and conducting his or her own defense under certain
circumstances."30 But this right is not unqualified as, Bassiouni continues,
26 See id. at 45 (quoting Comments on the Secretariat Outline, at 7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.3/SR.9 (1947), where it says "In the determination of his rights and
obligations, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial
tribunal and the aid of counsel. No one shall be convicted and punished for crime except
after public trial pursuant to law in effect at the time of the commission of the act
charged.").
27 Id. at 54 (quoting Summary Record of the 110th Meeting, at 8, [1979], U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR. 110).
28 Id. at 57.
29 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights In The Context of Criminal Justice:
Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National
Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 283 (1993).
30 Id. (emphasis added). Bassiouni studied 139 constitutions to determine the level
of international protections given to a defendant with respect to various types of rights.
He found that the right to self-representation is guaranteed in 33 of the national
constitutions that he surveyed, while more than 65 constitutions contain language
pertaining to the right of defense. Id.
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"representation of counsel is not only a matter of interest to the accused, but
is also paramount to due process of the law and to the integrity of the judicial
process."'31 Accordingly, this can be accomplished only by ensuring that such
self-representation is adequate and effective.32 It logically follows that a
court "should appoint professional counsel to supplement self-representation;
conversely, whenever it is in the best interest of justice and in the interest of
adequate and effective representation of the accused, the court should
disallow self-representation and appoint professional counsel. 33
Even Manfred Nowak, author of the most authoritative commentary on
the ICCPR, acknowledges that "it is disputed whether the State may
introduce an absolute requirement of mandatory counsel in criminal trials
and thereby force an accused to accept an ex-officio defense counsel when he
cannot afford his own attorney." 34 Nowak did not suggest that the State is
prohibited from doing so, but only that there is ongoing debate about the
propriety of such action, especially in regards to adversarial systems. It
follows that the same debate would arise for a non-indigent defendant, as the
provision in question makes no distinction based on financial capability.
It is also important to recognize that while most common law countries
recognize a right of self-representation, civil law countries including France,
Germany, and Belgium, among others, do not feel compelled to permit a
defendant to represent himself.35 In civil law countries, defense counsel can
be imposed on the defendant in serious cases, which happen to be most
criminal cases with the potential for long sentences. In France, during a trial,
the presence of a lawyer is required before the Cour d'Assises,36 which has
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 283-84 (emphasis added).
3 4 MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 258 (1993) (emphasis added).
35 Prosecutor v. Vojislav tegelj, Case No.: IT-03-67-PT, May 9, 2003, at paras. 16-
17 ("Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav
tegelj"). This decision also refers to § 731 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act as
requiring mandatory defense counsel in "specific circumstances." Moreover, Article 71
of the Criminal Procedure Act of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provides that the
defendant will be assigned defense counsel if the criminal offense has a penalty of more
than ten years in prison. The decision also notes that defense counsel is mandatory even if
the defendant has the "requisite legal qualifications." Article 66 of the Criminal
Procedure Code for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of November 20, 1998
similarly provides. Id. at n.34.
36 Gerald L. Kock & Richard S. Frase, The French Code of Criminal Procedure 2,
in THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 29, 152, 164 (1988) (citing Articles
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jurisdiction to try felonies (offenses punished by imprisonment with hard
labor, for life, or for a fixed period of time).37 Germany similarly requires
mandatory defense counsel in certain situations, including where the
defendant is charged with a serious offense, where the presiding judge finds
that the assistance of defense counsel appears necessary because of the
difficult factual or legal situation, or where it is evident that the defendant
cannot defend himself.38 In Belgium, the President of the court must verify
whether the defendant has selected counsel of his choice to represent him in
front of the Cour d'Assises; if the defendant has not so selected, the President
must designate counsel for the defendant.39
Given the contrary widespread practice of the civil law countries, it
would be difficult to properly conclude that the right to self-representation
has in fact attained the level of customary international law, as the Miloevi
Trial Chamber surprisingly found. Moreover, the Human Rights Committee,
which is the treaty body established to provide authoritative interpretation of,
the ICCPR,40 has asserted that provisions in the ICCPR that represent
customary international law may not be the subject of reservations, and it has
identified an extensive list of such provisions. 41 At the same time, the Human
274 and 317 of the French Code de procedure prnale, available at
http://droit.org/code/index-CPROCPEL.html (last visited Oct 10. 2004)).
37 Valerie Dervieux, The French System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 218,
231 (Mireille Delmas-Marty and J.R. Spencer eds., 2002); Kock & Frase, supra note 36.
Compare to "dilits" and "contraventions," where the punishment is much less severe and
may only involve a fine.
3 8 See STRAFPROZEBORDNUNG (CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE), art. 140, available
at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StPO.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); Rudolphe
Juy-Birmann, The German System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 304-5 (Mireille
Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 2002).
39 See BELGIAN CODED INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE, art. 293, available at
http://www.juridat.be/cgi-loi/legislation.pl (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
40 ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 28.
41 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 (52), General comment on
issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the
Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the
Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.6 (1994), available at
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom24.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
Reservations that offend peremptory norms would not be compatible with the
object and purpose of the Covenant. Although treaties that are mere exchanges of
obligations between States allow them to reserve inter se application of rules of
general international law, it is otherwise in human rights treaties, which are for the
benefit of persons within their jurisdiction. Accordingly, provisions in the Covenant
that represent customary international law (and a fortiori when they have the
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Rights Committee has stated that reservations to particular clauses of Article
14 may be acceptable, though a general reservation to the right to a fair trial
would not be.42 Consequently, it can be inferred that the absolute right to
defend oneself has not achieved the status of customary international law.
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights provides
further support for this view. Interpreting a clause in the European
Convention with the same language as Article 14(d)(3) of the ICCPR, the
European Court has "taken a relatively restrictive stance and affirmed the
right of States to assign a defense counsel against the will of the accused in
the administration of justice."43 The Milogevi6 Trial Chamber dismissed the
importance of this precedent because of the fact that the nature of the
proceedings at the ICTY is adversarial, and the imposition of defense counsel
is a feature of the inquisitorial system, which is most prevalent among the
European states.44 However, international and hybrid courts such as the
ICTY, ICTR, International Criminal Court (ICC), SCSL, and the Special
Iraqi Tribunal are sui generis, representing a blending of the common law
and civil law approaches. 45 Thus, the practice of the civil law countries
should not be discounted.
character of peremptory norms) may not be the subject of reservations.
Accordingly, a State may not reserve the right to engage in slavery, to torture, to
subject persons to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to
arbitrarily deprive persons of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, to
deny freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to presume a person guilty unless
he proves his innocence, to execute pregnant women or children, to permit the
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, to deny to persons of marriageable
age the right to marry, or to deny to minorities the right to enjoy their own culture,
profess their own religion, or use their own language. And while reservations to
particular clauses of Article 14 may be acceptable, a general reservation to the right
to a fair trial would not be.
Id. at para. 8 (emphasis added).
42 Id.
43 NOWAK, supra note 34, at 259.
44 Milogevi6 Reasoned Decision, supra note 14, at paras. 24-25.
45 See generally, Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal
Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725,
727-28 (1999); Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 80 (1999) (quoting
an ICTY Trial Chamber:
[N]either the rules issuing from the common law tradition in respect of the
admissibility of hearsay evidence nor the general principle prevailing in the civil law
systems, according to which, barring exceptions, all relevant evidence is admissible,
including hearsay evidence, because it is the judge who finally takes a decision on
the weight to ascribe to it, are directly applicable before this Tribunal. The
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C. The Cases Cited in the Milogevid Trial Chamber Decision
The Milogevi6 Trial Chamber sought to derive support for its decision
from the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee. Upon close
examination, however, the precedent cited does not stand for the broad
proposition asserted by the Trial Chamber.
In the vast jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, there is only
one case relevant to the right to self-representation: the case of Michael &
Brian Hill v. Spain.46 As the Milogevi6 Trial Chamber pointed out, in Hill,
the Human Rights Committee found that the defendant had the right to
defend himself pursuant to Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR.47 But the Hill case
is factually unique in several respects that discount the general applicability
of the Human Rights Committee's finding. The case concerned the Hills'
complaint that a series of lawyers appointed to represent them at various
stages in the criminal proceedings were unable to communicate with them in
their language, did not understand or ignored their instructions, and did not
make much effort to prepare their defense. 48 The complaint to the Human
Rights Committee centered on "their indignation at the judicial and
bureaucratic system in Spain."49 They claimed violations of the principle of
equality of the parties at all stages of the trial.50 The Hills "attribute[d] their
conviction to a series of misunderstandings during the trial caused by the
lack of proper interpretation." 51
The report of the Human Rights Committee concluded that the right of
Michael Hill to defend himself "was emphatically denied by the judiciary on
two occasions. Michael Hill made clear his desire to defend himself well in
advance of the Court proceedings via the official interpreter, Ms. Rieta.' 52
International Tribunal is, in fact, a sui generis institution with its own rules of
procedure which do not merely constitute a transposition of national legal systems.
The same holds for the conduct of the trial which, contrary to the Defence
arguments, is not similar to an adversarial trial, but is moving towards a more hybrid
system);
Patricia M. Wald, Judging War Crimes, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 189, 192-94 (2000).
46 Michael & Brian Hill v. Spain, Communication No. 526/1993, U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/59/D/526/1993 (2 April 1997), available at http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/
undocs/html/526-1993.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
47 Id.
4 8 Id. at para. 3.1.
49 Id. at para. 4.1.
50 Id. at para. 4.2.
51 Id. at para. 6.1.
52 Id. at para. 10.6.
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The report further recalled that Spain "[concedes] that its legislation does not
allow a defendant person to defend himself in person, as provided for under
the Covenant." 53 The Human Rights Committee concluded that Michael
Hill's right to defend himself was not respected.
Yet, nowhere in the Hill decision did the Human Rights Committee say
that the procedural codes of civil law systems, where it is common practice
to assign mandatory counsel, are inconsistent with the ICCPR. The Hill
decision makes clear that the review of the process must take into account the
right of the defendant to participate in the proceedings, or to have counsel of
whom he or she approves. In the Hill case, the defendant was unable to
effectively participate in his defense because of the incompetence of the
assigned counsel. It was the view of the Human Rights Committee that the
only chance for Michael Hill to receive a fair trial under those circumstances
would be to allow him to represent himself.
The Milogevi6 Trial Chamber finished its review of Hill by noting "that
the only case on the issue decided under these conventions which the Trial
Chamber has been able to find did not allow for such an exception." 54 In
other words, Hill is the sole definitive support offered by the Milogevi6 Trial
Chamber for the idea that Milogevid has an absolute fundamental
international right to refuse assigned counsel. The Milogevi6 Trial Chamber
overstated the significance of Hill by saying that the Human Rights
Committee rejected the imposition of defense counsel on an unwilling
defendant. 55 The Human Rights Committee's position can most fairly be
characterized as reiterating that a defendant has the right to represent himself,
where the interests of justice so require.
While Hill was the only case the Milogevi6 Trial Chamber could find to
support its position, it had to contend with the adverse precedent of Croissant
v. Germany, in which the European Court for Human Rights held that there
had been no violation of Article 6(3)(c) and that "it is for the courts to decide
whether the interests of justice require that the defendant be defended by
counsel appointed by them."56
In that case, Croissant, a German national, faced criminal proceedings in
connection with his activities as the lawyer of various members of the "Red
Army Faction." 57 He was initially represented by two lawyers of his choice
53 Id. at para. 14.2.
54 Milogevid Reasoned Decision, supra note 14, at para. 36.
55 Id. at para. 37.
56 Croissant v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 135, (1992), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudocldoc/HEJUD/sift/321.txt (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
57 Id. at para. 6.
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in the criminal proceedings. 58 On application by the prosecuting authority,
the President of the German Regional Court designated a third court-
appointed defense counsel. 59 Croissant objected to the appointment of
another counsel, and to the choice of the individual.60 The court found that,
"[w]hen appointing defense counsel the national courts must certainly have
regard to the defendant's wishes; indeed, German law contemplates -such a
course .... However, they can override those wishes when there are relevant
and sufficient grounds for holding that this is necessary in the interests of
justice." 61
In an effort to distinguish this case, the Milogevi6 Trial Chamber
correctly points out that Croissant did not concern the wishes of one
defendant to represent himself, but it did deal with the power of the court to
subject a non-indigent defendant to counsel. In the end, neither case
constitutes particularly good authority on the issue of the right of self-
representation.
It is noteworthy that the Trial Chamber did opine in passing that "the
right to defend oneself in person is not absolute," though it did not explain
the contours of the exceptions to the asserted right, other than to refer to Rule
80(B) of the ICTY Statute, which deals with the removal of a defendant from
the courtroom. 62 In the next section, this article explores the likelihood that
the defendant will act in a disruptive manner, and the complexity of the case,
as factors warranting the appointment of counsel in a war crimes trial
involving a former rogue leader.
58 Id. at para. 7.
59 Id. at para. 8.
60 Id. at para. 9.
61 Id. at para. 29.
62 Id. at para. 40. See Amended Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, Rule
80(B), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004)
[hereinafter ICTY Rules] ("The Trial Chamber may order the removal of a [defendant]
from the courtroom and continue the proceedings in the absence of the [defendant] if the
[defendant] has persisted in disruptive conduct following a warning that such conduct
may warrant the removal of the defendant from the courtroom.").
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III. THE CASE FOR REQUIRING A FORMER ROGUE LEADER TO ACT
THROUGH COUNSEL
A. Likelihood that the Defendant Will Act in a Disruptive Manner
The likelihood that a defendant will act in a disruptive manner may be
inherent with certain types of defendants, especially former rogue leaders
who publicly challenge the court's authority to try them. It is particularly
useful then to examine U.S. jurisprudence on limiting the right of self-
representation in the case of disruptive defendants.
In Faretta v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conduct his or her own defense in
a criminal case.63 However, it is important to recognize that the Supreme
Court qualified this pronouncement by stating that such a "right of self-
representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom."64 As
discussed below, since Faretta, several courts have found that self-
representation may be terminated if the defendant acts in a disruptive
manner.
Under American jurisprudence, the right to counsel is the paramount
right in relation to the right to self-representation. 65 As the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has reasoned, "if [the right to counsel
is] wrongly denied, the defendant is likely to be more seriously injured than
if denied his right to proceed pro se.' '66 In Tuitt v. Fair, the appellant,
convicted of armed robbery and carrying a firearm without lawful authority,
alleged that his right to counsel was infringed when he was denied his
requests for a continuance and for a substitution of counsel, or for permission
to proceed unrepresented. 67 On appeal, the First Circuit held that "[t]he right
to counsel is subject to practical constraints," 68 such that "the right of an
accused to choose his own counsel cannot be insisted upon in a manner that
63 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
64 Id. at 834 n.46.
65 Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166, 177 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d
597, 601 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cauley, 697 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Harris, 317
F. Supp. 2d 542, 544-45 (D.N.J. 2004).
66 Tuitt, 822 F.2d at 177.
67 Id.
68 Id. (referring to where the trial court required the appellant to definitively waive
counsel before allowing him to represent himself because it was not convinced that the
appellant had done so).
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will obstruct reasonable and orderly court procedure." 69 Similarly, in United
States v. Mack, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated that a defendant's right to self-representation does not overcome the
court's right to maintain order in the courtroom.70 The court further reasoned
that "[a] defendant does not forfeit his right to representation at trial when he
acts out. He merely forfeits his right to represent himself in the
proceeding." 71 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v. Cauley refused to allow a disruptive defendant to dismiss his
legal aid lawyer and proceed unrepresented.72 The court found that his
"behavior in court was that of an easily angered man,"73 and noted that the
defendant "interrupted the cross-examination.., with shouted obscenities." 74
He also refused to answer questions posed to him. In United States v. West,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held similarly.75
The appellant in that case attacked the court's "integrity and dignity by
characterizing it as the 'home team' on the side of the government. '76 The
court held that the lower court was correct in finding that the appellant
forfeited his right to self-representation by "flouting the responsibility" given
to him.77 Most recently, in United States v. Harris, the federal district court
in New Jersey turned down a defendant's request to self-representation. 78 As
justification for this, the court found that the defendant refused to
acknowledge the authority of the court, showed disrespect for the court, and
that his attempts to proceed unrepresented were meant to disrupt the court. 79
The above forms of disruption have accompanied the cases of former
rogue leaders currently before international courts and tribunals. As the
description of Milogevid's antics in the introduction illustrates, such
individuals openly question the legitimacy of the court, act disrespectfully to
69 United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 1977).
70 Mack, 362 F.3d at 601 (referring to where the appeals court reversed the trial
court's conviction because the district court removed the defendant from the courtroom,
leaving nobody to represent him. The court found this was a structural error which
violated the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment).
71 Id.
72 United States v. Cauley, 697 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1983).
73 Id. at 490.
74 Id. at 491.
75 United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 1989).
76 Id. at 287.
77 Id.
78 United States v. Harris, 317 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 (D.N.J. 2004).
79 Id. at 546.
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the judges, make speeches during cross-examination, and browbeat
witnesses. Drawing from the U.S. jurisprudence, in the alternative to a
blanket rule, international courts and tribunals could cite specific indicia of
disruptiveness on a case-by-case basis in determining whether self-
representation should be revoked. However, as discussed in greater detail in
Section B below, in the context of the trial of former rogue leaders, where the
eyes of the world are watching the proceedings and the complexity of the
case demands careful execution, the court should not wait until the defendant
actually disrupts the trial before appointing counsel, because by then it is too
late.
B. The Complexity of the Case and the Need for an Orderly Trial
International courts and tribunals are initiated in response to the gravest
of atrocities committed in the history of mankind. Cases involving former
rogue leaders accused of war crimes are particularly complex. Consequently,
the right to self-representation may be inherently incompatible with war
crimes trials involving such defendants in four respects. First, war crimes
courts or tribunals prosecute violations of international humanitarian law,
and have the overwhelming obligation of bringing the perpetrators to justice.
The gamut of legal skills used in ordinary domestic criminal cases is
insufficient for the trial of an accused war criminal. 80 Defense counsel must
be fluent in substantive and procedural legal aspects of international
humanitarian law, comparative law, and trial and written advocacy skills.8 '
Second, international courts such as the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC are sui
generis, representing a blending of the common law and civil law
approaches. 82 The judges are from both systems, and the procedural and
substantive outcomes will depend on a mixture of the two legal systems.
Even though the procedure tends to be closer to an adversarial model,
characteristic of common law countries, the international courts can be
characterized as hybrid.8 3 Third, mounting a defense to a war crimes charge
80 Mark S. Ellis, Achieving Justice Before the International War Crimes Tribunal:
Challenges for the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 519, 523 (1997).
81 Mark S. Ellis, The Evolution of Defense Counsel Appearing Before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 949,
970-71 (2003).
82 See generally May & Wierda, supra note 45, at 727-28; Murphy, supra note 45,
at 80; Wald, supra note 45, at 192-94.
83 See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCrrlES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 194
(2001).
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has proven to be quite daunting. In the first ICTY case of Prosecutor v.
Tadi6, defense counsel was already spending 12 to 14 hours a day, 6 days a
week in preparation for cross-examinations and direct examinations of
witnesses. 84 Milogevi6, with his defense set to begin in July 2004, will have
the difficult task of dealing with an even larger number of witnesses; he is
seeking to have nearly 1,400 witnesses testify in his trial (including former
president Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder). 85 Fourth, due to the nature of the crimes and
the geographic location of the courts in relation to the actual "crime scenes,"
access to the sites, evidence, and witnesses is especially challenging.8 6
Taking the above factors into account, it is not surprising that the ICTY
has questioned the weight to be accorded on the decisions of the Human
Rights Committee, the international body which interprets the ICCPR.87 One
commentator has suggested that the early jurisprudence and basic legal
documents of the ICTY suggest the phenomenon of a "chipping away of
certain rights of fair trial and a tendency in the jurisprudence to side-step
international human rights jurisprudence under the ICCPR-and other
regional bodies-by distinguishing the ICTY's obligations from those of
state parties to the ICCPR. ''88 Yet there is a need to interpret the provisions
of the ICCPR based on the "object and purpose" of international courts and
tribunals. Thus, the ICTY should not rely too heavily on the interpretation of
the Human Rights Committee, but rather adopt its own interpretations of
Article 14 of the ICCPR and its impact on its Statute.89
Although domestic courts in common law countries do not impose
defense counsel on an unwilling defendant in the absence of disruptive
conduct, some courts have propounded on the matter of competent self-
representation in complex cases and offer useful commentary. The domestic
courts limit their decisions to the case of indigent defendants without
representation. It is, however, axiomatic that the reasoning for such decisions
should be applied to all self-represented defendants in complex cases. The
same complexities and challenges for similarly-situated defendants to
overcome are present, whether one is indigent seeking representation, or a
rogue leader seeking to defend oneself to prove a point.
84 Ellis, supra note 80, at 529.
85 World in Brief, WASH. POST, June 18, 2004, at A24.
86 See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 80, at 533.
87 James Sloan, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
Fair Trial Rights: A Closer Look, 9 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 479, 485 (1996).
88 Id. at 480.
89 Id. at 485-86.
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The Supreme Court of India has found the fairness of a trial may be
implicated in circumstances where a defendant cannot understand all the
legal implications of the trial and appellate proceedings, as intricate questions
of law and fact are involved which require the skillful handling of a
competent lawyer, especially when the best of the public prosecutors appear
on the other side of the courtroom. 90 Even though the court limits the effect
of its judgment to indigent defendants, it can be argued that the issue of the
complexity of a trial is relevant whether the defendant is indigent or not.
Indigence does not lead to complexity. Rather, complexity follows from the
nature of the case, not the circumstances of the defendant. The court
reasoned that:
Judicial justice, with procedural intricacies, legal submissions and critical
examination of evidence, leans upon professional expertise; and a failure of
equal justice is on the cards where such supportive skill is absent for one
side. Our judicature, molded by Anglo-American models and our judicial
process, engineered by kindred legal technology, compel the collaboration
of lawyer-power for steering the wheels of equal justice under the law. 91
A self-represented defendant, regardless of his or her status as an
indigent or non-indigent, may be insufficiently qualified to represent himself
or herself adequately in a complex case and in such circumstances should be
provided with counsel. After all, to quote the Indian Supreme Court above,
"justice under the law" will not be realized if a non-indigent defendant
chooses to represent himself under similar circumstances.
This inference is further supported by Australian jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court of South Australia considered the case of applicants who
were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal against their
convictions for murder and attempted murder.92 The court considered that the
applicants could not conduct their own appeal effectively; they were
convicted following a trial that lasted several months, and "the grounds of
appeal and the application to call fresh evidence at the hearing of the appeal
90 Hussainara Khatoon & Others (IV) v. Home Secretary, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1369,
1374-75 (State of Bihar, Patna) [hereinafter Hussainara Khatoon] (referring to where the
Supreme Court of India held that there is a constitutional right of every defendant who is
unable to secure the legal services of a lawyer to have counsel assigned, provided that the
defendant wants legal representation); R.V. KEKLAR, R.V. KELKAR'S CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 472 (1993).
91 Hussainara Khatoon, at 1373 (quoting the Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597).
92 R. v. Gillard & Preston, 77 S.A. St. R. 366 (2000), at para. 1.
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[gave] rise to questions of some complexity." 93 The court held that they
should be allowed to apply to the court for an order assigning solicitors and
counsel to represent them at the hearing of the appeal, as allowing them to
proceed self-represented would not be in the interests of justice.94
Decisions of the Australian High Court are also helpful in understanding
the court's apprehension in allowing a defendant to proceed without counsel
in complex matters. In the landmark case of Dietrich v. R., the Australian
High Court held that proceedings may be stayed when an indigent defendant
is facing prosecution for a serious offense without legal representation (for
no fault of his or her own).95 In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the
proceedings should be adjourned, postponed, or stayed until legal
representation was available.96 In the recent judgment of Milat v. R., the
High Court discussed the application of Order 69A r 15(2) of the High Court
Rules which provides for the determination of applications for special leave
to appeal without oral argument. 97 The High Court ultimately held that an
unrepresented accused did not have the right to present oral arguments in his
application for special leave to appeal. 98
But the High Court in Milat further took into account, albeit in passing,
the "ever-increasing workload of the court," and the need for efficient
administration of the court's business. 99 The court discussed the teachings of
experience, and "that the most important part of the oral discussion-the
93 Id. at para. 5
94 Id. at para. 11.
95 Dietrich v. R., 177 C.L.R. 292 (1992) (finding that the trial of an indigent
accused, charged with a serious offense, who through no fault on his or her part is unable
to obtain legal representation, should in the absence of exceptional circumstances be
adjourned, postponed or stayed until legal representation is available).
96 Id. at 315.
97 Milat v. R., 205 A.L.R. 338, 340 (2004) (finding that Order 69A r 15(2) of the
High Court rules is directed to persons in the unrepresented applicant's position and was
designed to assist, not hinder, their special leave applications, and does not require that
the unrepresented applicant, who was at the time incarcerated, be brought to the court to
make oral submissions in support of his appeal). The Order provides that,
Where an application is listed for hearing and it appears to the Court or a
Justice that a party is likely to be unable, or that it is likely to be impracticable for a
party, to appear personally or by a legal representative to present oral argument, the
Court may direct that the party's case be considered on the basis of his or her
summary of argument and any reply without oral argument from that party.
Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 345.
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testing of the arguments by a Socratic dialogue-is rarely effective in the
case of applicants who are without legal representation... because they
generally lack the experience and legal knowledge to respond effectively to
the justices' questions. 'l °°
The concept of "equality of arms" further supports the position that a
defendant in a trial for war crimes should not have the absolute right of self-
representation. Article 20(1) of the ICTY Statute and Article 19(1) of the
ICTR Statute firmly embrace the right to "equality of arms" in their
practices, stating that "[tihe Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair
and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the
rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the
accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses."101 The
jurisprudence of both the ICTY and ICTR has dealt extensively with the
issue of "equality of arms" between the prosecution and the defense. Thus, in
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, the Appeals Chamber took the view that "equality of
arms obligates a judicial body to ensure that neither party is put at a
disadvantage when presenting its case." 102
From the inception of the ad hoc tribunals, "equality of arms" between
the defense and the prosecution has been a contentious issue. The opening act
of the ICTY, the Tadi case, is the perfect example of where defense counsel
cried foul due to a violation of the principle of "equality of arms." Defense
counsel argued that the "inequality of arms" had hampered the preparation of
their defense. 103 It is hard not to find credibility in such a statement when one
considers the "myriad of documents" that defense counsel must review, as
compared to the manpower that is employed in the Office of the
Prosecutor. 1 4 It is not surprising that this has been and continues to be the
primary concern raised by defense counsel with the Registrar of the ICTY. 10 5
One must remember that the relationship between the ICTY itself and the
Office of the Prosecutor is also complex, and makes the defendant an
10Id.
101 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA STATUTE,
art. 20(1), at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004)
[hereinafter ICTY STATUTE]; INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRmUNAL FOR RWANDA, art.
19(1), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2004) [hereinafter ICTR STATUTE].
102 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadid, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, Jul. 15, 1999, at para. 48,
("Judgement"), at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf (last
visited Oct. 10, 2004).
103 Ellis, supra note 81, at 963.
104 Id. at 964.
105 Id
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
underdog from the outset. This is obvious if one observes the full name of the
ICTY-the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991-"conflates the court and the
Prosecutor in one phrase and thus inadvertently reinforces this focus."' 06
Moreover, as pointed out by the current Deputy Registrar of the ICTY, for
those who have stepped foot in the building, "one can hardly fail to notice
that in its very physical layout, with Prosecutor and Court located 'cheek by
jowl' and defense counsel situated generally off site, there is perhaps a
metaphor for where the defense fits into the scheme of things."10 7 One
defense lawyer has complained, "We don't have a place to put our robes on.
There's no place to hang up our coats, or to lay down our briefcases! We
have been mistreated by this tribunal!"'1 8 It is not surprising that the
defendants before the courts, especially Milogevid, frequently argue that the
fora represent "victor's justice."109
By analogy, it can be argued that the correct interpretation of these
provisions in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals 10 and in Article 67(1)(d) of
the ICC Statute"'l referring to the right to counsel take the complexity of the
trials into account, places limits on the right of a defendant to conduct his or
her own defense. This interpretation is acceptable as it satisfies the
procedural qualms of the respective statutes and the particular nature of war
crime trials. The defense systems in these international courts and tribunals
make provision for specific rules on the appointment, qualifications, and
assignment of defense counsel in the Rules of Procedure, 112 as well as codes
of conduct and directives for the assignment of defense counsel.1
13
106 David Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship, 37
NEW ENG. L. REv. 975, 976 (2003).
107 Id.
108 Judging Genocide, THE ECONOMIST, June 16, 2001, at 23.
109 See Scharf, supra note 2, at 921-23.
110 ICTY STATUTE, art. 21(4)(d); ICTR STATUTE, art. 20(4)(d).
111 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT STATUTE, available at http://www.un.org/law/
icc/statute/romefra.htni (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
Subject to article 63, paragraph 2, to be present at the trial, to conduct the
defence in person or through legal assistance of the defendant's choosing, to be
informed, if the defendant does not have legal assistance, of this right and to have
legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case where the interests of justice so
require, and without payment if the defendant lacks sufficient means to pay for it.
Id.
112 See ICTY RULES, Rules 44-46; see INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Rules 44-46, available at
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The ICC has taken the protections first established by the ad hoc
tribunals a step further. Rule 22(1) of the ICC Rules of Procedure states that
defense counsel must be competent in criminal law and procedure, as well as
possess the necessary relevant experience in criminal proceedings, and
possess an excellent knowledge or fluency in at least one of the working
languages of the ICC (English or French).1 14 The ICC was designed to
remedy some of the deficiencies of its predecessors. Moreover, it is largely
accepted that the recent trend in the establishment of defense
organizations,' 1 5 and an International Criminal Bar Association, have been
furthered by the pursuit of equality of representation. It seems at odds with a
system that makes such an effort to promote "equality of arms" and extensive
qualifications upon defense counsel to accept that potentially unqualified
defendants would be allowed to defend themselves. After all, the most
competent of defendant, and most academically trained, such as Milogevid
and Segelj (both of whom are lawyers), 116 would, notwithstanding their own
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/rules/260503/270503e&fnew.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,
2004) [hereinafter ICTR RULES].
113 In the ICTR, there is the Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel, available
at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/defence/index.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2004); see also CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR DEFENCE COUNSEL, at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/codeconduct.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). In
the ICTY, there is the Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel, and The Code of
Professional Conduct for Defence Counsel Appearing before the International Tribunal,
at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
114 ICTR RULES, Rule 22(1), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/
basicdocuments/rules(e).html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
A counsel for the defence shall have established competence in international or
criminal law and procedure, as well as the necessary relevant experience, whether as
judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings. A
counsel for the defence shall have an excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at least
one of the working languages of the Court. Counsel for the defence may be assisted
by other persons, including professors of law, with relevant expertise.
Id.
115 Association of Defence Counsel (ADAD) before the ICTR; Association of
Defence Counsel Practicing before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ADC-ICTY); Association Internationale des Avocats de la
D6fense/International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association (AIAD/ICDAA).
116 Profile: Vojislav 9efelj, BBC News World Edition, Dec. 29, 2003, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2317765.stm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004) (stating that
egelj is highly educated, became the youngest Ph.D. holder in Yugoslavia, and went on
to teach first at the University of Michigan and then at Sarajevo universities); see Key
Milogevi6 Ally Defects to the Opposition: Rightwing Maverick Offers His Support to
Kostunica's Coalition, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 30, 2000, at 19 (stating that egelj
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training, have difficulty following the rules of procedure of an international
court, as well as standard international criminal law practices.
It is also worth stressing that there is a unique need in these cases for an
orderly trial to facilitate the peace and reconciliation process. After all, the
ICTY was created to "contribute to the restoration and maintenance of
peace."" l7 Justice in the form of legitimate trials can facilitate national
reconciliation. 118 It can potentially bring a definitive halt to violence in
conflict areas, such as the Balkans, by allowing victims to forgive and
reconcile with those who committed the atrocities. 119 An orderly and fair trial
can also allow a new government to detach itself from past practices of the
former regime. Furthermore, a historic record from such a legitimate trial can
educate the population from an affected country about what really happened
during the crises, possibly ensuring that such horrific acts are not repeated in
the future. 120 But if the trial is chaotic, the goal of fostering reconciliation
can be undermined. Although the Nuremberg trials have been criticized to a
certain extent, they were for the most part seen as fair and effective, and
Germans speak of them with respect.' 21
Former ICTY and ICTR Prosecutor Louise Arbour explained the
importance of the appearance of an orderly and fair trial, even before the
judgment is handed down: "even though there is no criminal responsibility
for governments under the statute, there is only one court that counts-the
court of public opinion."' 122 Unfortunately, due to Milogevid's antics, the
ICTY is not seen as a beacon of justice back in Serbia. The ICTY is
graduated at the top of his class in law school in Belgrade); DusKo DODER & LOuISE
BRANSON, MLOgEvIt: PORTRAIT OF A TYRANT 24 (1999) (stating that Milogevid is
himself a lawyer who graduated near the top of his class from the University of Belgrade
School of Law).
117 See United Nations Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
118 Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair:
Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HuM. RTS. Q. 573, 586
(2002).
119 Scharf, supra note 2, at 916; see also Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v.
Dusko Tadi: An Appraisal of the First International War Crimes Trial Since
Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 873-75 (1997).
120 Scharf, supra note 2, at 916.
121 RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 83, at 187-90; Scharf, supra note 2, at 932.
122 Louise Arbour & Aryeh Neier, History and Future of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1495, 1501
(1998).
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perceived in Serbia as "revenge on the victor's part," and "a western plot,
directed mainly at them."'123 If the court of public opinion is the court that
counts most, Milogevi6 is winning the case. 124
IV. THE ASSIGNMENT OF STANDBY COUNSEL
The Prosecutor v. Segelj and Prosecutor v. Norman cases of the ICTY
and the SCSL, respectively, represent a compromise between the needs of
international justice and the right to self-representation. In these cases, the
tribunals allowed the defendant to represent himself, but appointed a standby
defense counsel ready to step in as soon as the defendant got too disruptive
or the case got too complex. Although an improvement over self-
representation in war crimes trials, this approach is problematic as well to the
extent that it requires a specific showing of disruptiveness or complexity
before the court will turn the case over to the defense counsel. There might
be a limited scope for the defendant to take part in the proceedings, but the
judges should have the power (and discretion) to require counsel to act in
court from the beginning in order to maintain the decorum and fairness of the
proceedings.
123 Judging Genocide, supra note 108.
124 Scharf, supra note 2, at 930-31. Yet, history teaches that the positive effect of a
war crimes trial may take generations to materialize, and that contemporary opinion polls
may not be an accurate barometer of the success of the endeavor. Opinion polls
conducted by the U.S. Department of State from 1946 through 1958, for example,
indicated that a large majority of West Germans considered the Nuremberg proceedings
to be nothing but a show trial, representing victor's justice rather than real justice. See
PETER MAGUiRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 241 (2001). By 1953, the State
Department had concluded that the Nuremberg and Control Council Law No. 10 trials
had failed to "reeducate" West Germans. According to a recently de-classified 1953 State
Department report: "From the political point of view, the crux of the war criminals
problem in Germany is the refusal of a large number of Germans to accept the principles
underlying the [Nuremberg] trials or the findings of the trials. In spite of all the Western
powers have said to the contrary, the trials are generally portrayed as acts of political
retribution without firm legal basis." Id. at 246. Two generations later, however, the
German people largely speak of the Nuremberg Tribunal with respect, and Germany is
the foremost supporter of the permanent International Criminal Court, a modern day
Nuremberg Tribunal. See, e.g., German Attitudes Toward Jews, The Holocaust and the
U.S., at http://www.ajc.org/nTheMedia/PublicationsPrint.asp?did=708 (last visited Oct.
10, 2004).
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A. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Revisited
After the decision in Miloevi6, a second Trial Chamber (the ge~elj Trial
Chamber) took a different approach. 125 In its "Decision on Prosecution's
Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav egelj with his
Defence," the geAelj Trial Chamber found that Vojislav Segelj should be
assisted by standby counsel, and the court reserved the right to assign counsel
under Rule 44(A). 126 This was a victory for the prosecution, as it provided a
mechanism to rein in egelj, even though the gegelj Trial Chamber claimed to
reject the prosecution's motion in so far as that motion sought an order
"directing the Registrar to appoint legal counsel to assist the accused Seelj
with the preparation and conduct of his defence."' 27
egelj, a popular politician, surrendered himself to the ICTY on February
24, 2003.128 At his initial appearance, on February 26, 2003, he stated that
his decision to defend himself was a definite one, but that "it is possible that I
will engage an assistant and a legal advisor who will never appear on my
behalf in this courtroom. They will never appear in this courtroom. I retain
this exclusivity of appearing in the courtroom on the side of the accused."1 29
Further attempts to question Seelj's decision led to the same answer-that
he fully intended to represent himself. Similar to the Milogevi6 motion, the
prosecution in gelelj sought an order from the Seelj Trial Chamber directing
that legal counsel be appointed to assist the defendant with his defense in
view of the fact that "the interests of justice require such action due to the
complexity of the case; the Defendant's express intention to cause harm to
the Tribunal and to use the proceedings as a forum for Serb national interests;
the consequent possibility of a disorderly trial; the necessity to safeguard the
administration of justice; and the public interest in the restoration of peace in
the former Yugoslavia."'130
125 Prosecutor v. Vojislav egelj, Case No.: IT-03-67-PT, May 9, 2003 ("Decision
on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav egelj").
126 Id. at Disposition.
127 Id.
128 Id. at para. 2.
129 Prosecutor v. Vojislav egelj, Case No.: IT-03-67-PT, Transcript, Feb. 26, 2003,
at 6, at http://www.un.org/icty/transe87/030226IA.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
130 Prosecutor v. Vojislav egelj, Case No.: IT-03-67-PT, May 9, 2003, at para. 3
("Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav
egelj").
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The .egelj Trial Chamber first noted that Article 21 of the ICTY Statute
"does not on its face exclude the possibility of offering an accused the
assistance of assigned counsel where the interests of justice so require. The
need may arise for unforeseeable reasons to protect an accused's interests
and to ensure a fair and expeditious trial."'
31
The ge.elj Trial Chamber took on the difficult task of fleshing out the
phrase "in the interests of justice." The Chamber enumerated a non-
exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether the right to a fair
trial is achieved. The list clearly included many of the problems that had
arisen in the course of the Milogevi6 Trial that was taking place elsewhere in
the building:
It includes the right to a fair trial, which is not only a fundamental right of
the Accused, but also a fundamental interest of the Tribunal related to its
own legitimacy. In the context of the right to a fair trial, the length of the
case, its size and complexity need to be taken into account. The complex
legal, evidential and procedural issues that arise in a case of this magnitude
may fall outside the competence even of a legally qualified accused,
especially where that accused is in detention without access to all the
facilities he may need. Moreover, the Tribunal has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that the trial proceeds in a timely manner without interruptions,
adjournments or disruptions. 132
The Se3elj Trial Chamber noted that the attitude and actions of Segelj
"are indicative of obstructionism on his part."'133 The geelj Trial Chamber
was mindful of the recent decision in Milogevi6, yet understood that both the
rights of egelj and the interests of justice were clearly at risk. The geelj
Trial Chamber sought to separate itself from the Milogevi6 Trial Chamber,
even though one has to assume that a completely opposite decision would not
reflect favorably on the ICTY, where earlier in the year the latter chamber
surprised the legal world by upholding Milogevid's request to represent
himself. It is inconceivable that the circumstances surrounding Milogevid-
where his health is in issue and where his ability to cope with the workload
and the expeditiousness of the trial are severely questioned-do not rise at
least to the level of prejudice contemplated by the Segelj Trial Chamber. The
ge3elj Trial Chamber concluded that imposing standby counsel would fulfill
131 Id. at para. 11.
132 Id. at para. 21 (emphasis added).
133 Id. at para. 26; see also paras. 22-25 (for the reasoning of the e elj Trial
Chamber).
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the requirements of Rule 44(A), as well as leave egelj's right to defend
himself intact.134
The term standby counsel is not self-explanatory, and the geelj Trial
Chamber madeit abundantly clear that the function of standby counsel is not
to assist the geelj Trial Chamber in the manner of amicus curae. According
to the ge.elj Trial Chamber, the role of the standby counsel is to "safeguard a
fair and expeditious trial," and encompasses the benefits of a regular
relationship between a client and its counsel, such as counsel-client privilege
between egelj and standby counsel. 135 Moreover, the same requirements are
imposed on standby counsel by the ICTY as on regular counsel working in
cases before the ICTY. 136
The geelj Trial Chamber defined the role of standby counsel as (1)
assisting -eelj in the preparation of his case and offering advice in the pre-
trial phase and at trial whenever requested by the defendant, and to be
engaged actively in the substantive preparation at all times in order to take
over at any time, especially in exceptional circumstances if the Trial
Chamber removes egelj from the courtroom under Rule 80(B); (2) receiving
copies of all documents sent to egelj; (3) being present in the courtroom at
all times; (4) addressing the Trial Chamber upon request of §egelj or the
Chamber; and. (5) dealing with witnesses and the most sensitive of issues,
without depriving §egelj of his right to control only the content of the
examination. 137
The geSelj Trial Chamber did not mask its disagreement with the
Miloevi Trial Chamber. In a complete departure from the ruling in
Miloevi6, the ,gegelj Trial Chamber lent support to the argument that ICCPR
Article 14(3)(d), and similar provisions in regional conventions and its own
Statute do not declare that the right to work through legal counsel is
derivative of the primary right to represent oneself. As the ,egelj Trial
Chamber observed: "It would be a misunderstanding of the word 'or' in the
phrase 'to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing' to conclude that self-representation excludes the appointment of
counsel to assist the Accused or vice versa." 138 The geelj Trial Chamber
held that §egelj could file a power of attorney under Rule 44(A) to receive
additional assistance from counsel. 139
134 Id. at para. 28.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at para. 30.
138 Id. at para. 29.
139 Id.
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B. Special Court for Sierra Leone
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) Statute has a similar
provision concerning the right to counsel.140 In a recent decision, a SCSL
Trial Chamber found that the defendant Samual Hinga Norman could not
represent himself without the assistance of standby counsel. 141 Norman is
being tried with Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa in the Civil Defense
Forces (CDF) case. Norman indicated in a letter of June 3, 2004, after the
opening statement of the prosecutor, that he wished to represent himself and
that he was dispensing of his defense counsel that had been acting on his
behalf since March 2003.142
In requiring the appointment of standby counsel, the SCSL Trial
Chamber sought to distinguish Norman's situation from that of Milogevi6.
First, Norman is being tried with two co-defendants.1 43 Second, Norman did
not signal his intention to represent himself from the outset.144 The SCSL
Trial Chamber then turned to the characteristics of the CDF trial that made it
impossible for Norman to represent himself. These factors, however, were
also present in Milogevi6. According to the SCSL Trial Chamber, the right of
counsel is an essential and necessary component of a fair trial. 145 Without
counsel, the judges are forced to be a proactive participant in the proceedings
instead of the arbiter, which is one of the greatest characteristics of an
adversarial proceeding. 146 The SCSL Trial Chamber turned to the complexity
of the case and the intricacies of international criminal law, as well as the
national and international interest in the "expeditious completion of the
140 See STATUTE OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, art. 17(4)(d), available
at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004) [hereinafter SCSL].
141 Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No.: SCSL-04-14-T, June 8, 2004, at
para. 32 ("Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self-Representation
Under Art. 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court").
142 Id. at paras. 3-5.
143 Id. at para. 19.
144 d.
145 Id. at para. 26.
146 Id.
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trial. ' 147 The trial judges were also concerned with the impact on the court's
timetable.148
The decision to appoint standby counsel is not a wise one in these two
instances, as it appears as though history will almost certainly repeat itself.
The situation surrounding egelj's trial best illustrates this concern. Like
Milogevid, egelj is popular in Serbia, where he was the 2002 front-runner
for the Presidency before his surrender to the Tribu'nal. 149 As acknowledged
by the gegelj Trial Chamber, egelj has tried to use the ICTY for political
gain outside of the courtroom, good cause for concern has been shown that
he may be disruptive in proving his point, and he has repeatedly stated that
he does not consider the Tribunal to be a legitimate legal body. 150 Although
Segelj is a lawyer, he does not have the requisite legal qualifications to mount
a defense to the complex charges brought against him. The geelj Trial
Chamber has also questioned his competence at the most basic levels-his
submissions have not been legally sufficient, and he has refused to accept a
device for typing his motions and to take notes for fear that he might receive
an electric shock.151 The assignment of standby counsel is not sufficient in
these circumstances; such defendants should be fully represented by highly
qualified attorneys from the outset.
C. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The ICTR has vocally endorsed the mandatory assignment of defense
counsel, 152 but due to the particular requests of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and
the popular and widely-cited concurrence in the decision, it is not clear how
the ICTR would treat a defendant that seeks self-representation, such as
Milogevid, egelj, and Norman. Nevertheless, the ICTR has not qualified the
assignment of mandatory counsel.
147 Id. Norman objected to -the idea of standby counsel and threatened to boycott
attendance, before eventually agreeing to the decision to have his former legal team serve
as standby counsel, in conformity with the definition outlined by the gegelj Trial
Chamber. Statement by the Trial Chamber on the State of the Proceedings in the Trial of
the CDF Group of Indictees, June 15, 2004.
148 Id.
149 Profile: VOjislav gegelj, supra note 116.
150 See egelj Decision, supra note 35, at para. 4 ( egelj has intimated to behaving in
a 'disruptive, obstructionist or scandalous' manner); see also id. at paras. 22-23.
151 Id. at paras. 7, 23-24.
152 Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No.: ICTR-97-19-T, Nov. 2, 2000
("Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw"). All documents from this case are
available through the ICTR website, http://www.ictr.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
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Even though the ICTR judges decided only at the 12th Plenary Session
held in 2002 to add Rule 45 Quater to the ICTR's Rules of Procedure and
Evidence which provides that a Trial Chamber may, in the interest of justice,
instruct the Registrar to assign counsel to represent the interests of the
defendant, 153 the ICTR was required to address this situation in a case some
time earlier. 154 Rule 45 Quater in essence codified this power that the Trial
Chamber had previously exercised. 155
The jurisprudence of the ICTR has left open the possibility of assigning
counsel to a defendant on a case-by-case basis in the interests of justice. The
ICTR Trial Chamber dealt with this issue in the Barayagwiza case in 2000.
Barayagwiza, also a lawyer by training, was a founding member of the
Coalition pour la Dfense de la R~publique (CDR) party, and was a member
of the comit d'initiative, which organized the founding of the company
Radio Tlkvision Libre des Mille Collines, S.A. 156 He also held the post of
Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.! 57 The ICTR
Trial Chamber took the right to self-representation as articulated in the
Statute as a starting point, but noted that according to international (and some
national) jurisprudence, this right is not absolute. 158
The Registrar declined Barayagwiza's request on January 5, 2000 for the
withdrawal of his counsel, J.P.L. Nyaberi. 159 Barayagwiza sought the
withdrawal citing reasons of "lack of competence, honesty, loyalty,
153 ICTR RULES, 109 Rule 45 Quater.
154 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, International Humanitarian Law from Nuremberg to
Rome: The Weighty Precedents of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 14
PACE INT'L L. REV. 273, 300-01 (2002). Some commentators point to the precedent of
Jean-Paul Akayesu before the ICTR in establishing that the defendant is entitled to self-
representation. This is so because Akayesu fired his counsel after being convicted and
was permitted to act on his own at the sentencing phase of his trial. See William A.
Schabas, Article 67 Rights of the Defendant, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 845,
857 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). However, this case may not be a good indicator as to the
practice of the ICTR, and definitely does not lead one to believe that the right is absolute,
as the trial was over.
155 Moghalu, supra note 154, at 301.
156 Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No.: ICTR-99-52-T, at para. 6
("Judgement").
157 Id.
158 See generally Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No.: ICTR-97-19-T,
Nov. 2, 2000 ("Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw").
159 Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No.: ICTR-99-52-T, at para. 82
("Judgement").
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diligence, and interest." 160 The Registrar's decision was confirmed by the
President of the ICTR on January 19, 2000,161 but on January 31, 2000, the
Appeals Chamber ordered the withdrawal of Barayagwiza's defense counsel,
J.P.L. Nyaberi, and ordered the assignment of new counsel and co-counsel
for Barayagwiza. Carmelle Marchessault and David Danielson were
subsequently appointed lead and co-counsel for Barayagwiza,
respectively. 162
Nevertheless, Barayagwiza declined to accept the assigned counsel.
Marchessault and Danielson informed the ICTR Trial Chamber that
Barayagwiza would not be attending the trial, and had instructed counsel not
to represent him at the trial, based on his inability to have a fair trial due to
the previous decisions of the ICTR in relation to his provisional release. 163
The ICTR Trial Chamber ordered counsel to continue representing
Barayagwiza. Counsel filed a motion to withdraw on October 26, 2000,
given their client's instructions not to represent him at trial, which was
denied on November 2, 2000, on the basis that the ICTR Trial Chamber had
to ensure the rights of Barayagwiza. 164 The ICTR Trial Chamber held
Barayagwiza's behavior to be "an attempt to obstruct proceedings. In such a
situation, it cannot reasonably be argued that Counsel is under an obligation
to follow them, and that [sic] not do so would constitute grounds for
withdrawal."' 165 It referred to the "well established principle in human rights
law that the judiciary must ensure the rights of the accused, taking into
account what is at stake for him."166 The ICTR Trial Chamber further noted
that assigned counsel "represents the interest of the Tribunal to ensure that
the Accused receives a fair trial. The aim is to obtain efficient representation
and adversarial proceedings."' 167 It was only on February 6, 2001 that the
ICTR Trial Chamber directed the Registrar to withdraw their assignment and
appoint new counsel for Barayagwiza because he had terminated their
mandate. 168
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at para. 83.
164 MId.
165 Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No.: ICTR-97-19-T, Nov. 2, 2000,
at para. 24 ("Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw").
166Id. at para. 23.
167 Id. at para. 21.
168 Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No.: ICTR-99-52-T, at para. 83
("Judgement").
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Judge Gunawardana took the decision a step further. He highlighted, in
his separate concurrence, the court's power to control its own proceedings. 69
He discussed the effect a decision to grant the withdrawal of counsel would
have on the administration of justice of the trial. 170 He submitted that Article
20(4)(d), 171 the now infamous provision founded on ICCPR Article 14(3)(d),
is "an enabling provision for the appointment of a 'standby counsel,"' and in
such circumstances the ICTR should make use of court-appointed standby
counsel. 172
V. CONCLUSION
Iraqi authorities organizing the Iraqi Special Tribunal have sent the
message that they want their Tribunal to encompass the principles and
lessons adopted by the "true" international tribunals that have preceded it.173
Article 20(d)(4) of the Special Tribunal Statute includes the same language
regarding self-representation as the other instruments previously discussed:
"to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing."'174 The Iraqi Special Tribunal should not,
however, follow the approach of the MiloMevi Trial Chamber, which
permitted the former Serb leader to represent himself in court, despite doing
so in a thoroughly disruptive manner.
This article has demonstrated the fallacy of the Milo§evi Trial
Chamber's conclusion that the defendant's right to self-representation is
169 Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No.: ICTR-97-19-T, Nov. 2, 2000
("Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw, Concurring and Separate Opinion
of Judge Gunawardana").170 Id.
171 ICTR STAT. art. 20(4)(d).
To be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person or
through legal assistance of his or her own choosing; to be informed, if he or she does
not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him
or her, in any case where the interest of justice so require, and without payment by
him or her in any such case if he or she does not have sufficient means to pay for it.
Id.
172 Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No.: ICTR-97-19-T, Nov. 2, 2000
("Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw, Concurring and Separate Opinion
of Judge Gunawardana").
173 See Marlise Simons, The Struggle for Iraq: Justice; Iraqis Meet with War
Crimes Trial Experts, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 2004, at A9.
174 THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, art. 20(d)(4), at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/human-rights/Statute.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2004).
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protected as a customary international law right. The underlying purpose of
the defendant's right "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance
of his own choosing" is to ensure a fair trial, an objective that can best be met
in cases of former leaders accused of international crimes by assigning the
defendant a highly qualified attorney who is vigilantly committed to
representing his client's interests.
The ,gegelj Trial Chamber of the ICTY has attempted to avoid a repeat of
the Miloevi situation by assigning standby counsel over the objection of the
defendant. This novel approach has also been recently employed by the
ICTR and SCSL. It is significant that these international tribunals have
recognized that assignment of counsel to an unwilling defendant is
permissible under international law and is sometimes necessary to safeguard
the legitimacy of the proceedings. However, in light of the likelihood of
disruptive behavior, the nature and the complexity of the trials, and the
prominence placed on the concept of "equality of arms" in the context of war
crimes trials, counsel should be required to represent such defendants in
court from the outset, rather than waiting for the trial to unravel before being
directed to step in.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
As this article was in final page proofs, on September 22, 2004, with the
Milogevi6 trial about to begin the defense phase, the Trial Chamber (now
composed of Patrick Robinson, O-Gon Kwon, and lain Bonomy) decided to
revisit Judge May's ruling that Slobodan Milogevi6 had a right to represent
himself in the courtroom. As discussed in this article, there were two
independent grounds upon which Judge May's ruling could potentially have
been reversed.
First, the Trial Chamber might have held that the language of the ICTY
Statute does not in fact give the defendant the right to self-representation.
The language from the Yugoslavia tribunal statute originally comes from an
identically worded clause contained in the European Convention on Human
Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
negotiating record of these treaties indicates that the drafters' concern was
with effective representation, not self-representation. In other words, the
drafters felt that a defendant should have a right to either be represented by a
lawyer or to represent himself; they did not state that each defendant must be
asked to choose between the two. Unlike Britain and the United States, most
countries of the world do not allow criminal defendants to represent
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themselves under any circumstances, and this has been deemed consistent
with international law by the European Court of Human Rights.' 75
Second, even if Judge May was correct in his reading of the law, as
providing a right to self-representation, the Trial Chamber could find that he
was wrong to treat that right as absolute. As authority for his position, Judge
May cited the U.S. Supreme Court's 1975 ruling in Faretta v. California,176
which held that there was a fundamental right to self-representation in U.S.
courts. But the U.S. high court also added a caveat, which Judge May
overlooked, stating that "the right of self-representation is not a license to
abuse the dignity of the courtroom." 177 U.S. appellate courts have
subsequently held that the right of self-representation is subject to
exceptions-such as when the defendant acts in a disruptive manner or when
self-representation interferes with the dignity or integrity of the
proceedings.178
In its ruling on September 22, the Trial Chamber focused on this second
ground, ruling that Milogevi6's poor health, which repeatedly disrupted the
trial, justified appointment of counsel to represent him in court for the
remainder of the proceedings. In its view:
If at any stage of a trial there is a real prospect that it will be disrupted and
the integrity of the trial undermined with the risk that it will not be
conducted fairly, then the Trial Chamber has a duty to put in place a regime
which will avoid that. Should self-representation have that impact, we
conclude that it is open to the Trial Chamber to assign counsel to conduct
the defense case, if the Accused will not appoint his own counsel. 179
Following the Trial Chamber's decision of September 22, Milogevid
refused to cooperate in any way with assigned counsel. Believing that they
could not adequately represent the defendant without such cooperation,
assigned counsel brought an interlocutory appeal to the ICTY Appeals
175 NOWAK, supra note 34, at 259; Croissant v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 135, 151
para. 29 (1992), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudocldoc/HEJUD/sift/321.txt
(last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
176 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 841 (1975).
177 Id. at 834 n.46.
178 United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. West,
877 F.2d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 1989); Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166, 177 (1st Cir. 1987);
United States v. Cauley, 697 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Harris, 317 F.
Supp. 2d 542, 544-45 (D.N.J. 2004).
179 Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, Sept. 22, 2004, at para. 33
("Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel").
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Chamber (consisting of Theodor Meron, Fausto Pocar, Florence Mumba,
Mehmet Guney, and Ines Monica Weinberg de Roca).
Based on the language of the ICTY Statute (without any analysis of the
negotiating record of the international instruments from which the language
originated), the Appeals chamber agreed that defendants have "a presumptive
right to represent themselves before the Tribunal."'180 The Appeals Chamber
also agreed with the Trial Chamber that the right was subject to limitations.
According to the Appeals Chamber, the test to be applied is that "the right
may be curtailed on the grounds that a defendant's self-representation is
substantially and persistently obstructing the proper and expeditious conduct
of his trial." 181 Applying this test, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the
Trial Chamber had not abused its discretion in deciding to restrict
Milogevid' s right to self-representation.1 82
However, the Appeals Chamber felt that the Trial Chamber's order
requiring Milogevi6 to act through appointed counsel went too far, and that
the proportionality principle required that a more "carefully calibrated set of
restrictions" be imposed on Milogevi6's trial participation. 183 Under these,
when he is physically able to do so, Milogevid must be permitted to take the
lead in presenting his case--choosing which witnesses to present,
questioning those witnesses, giving the closing statement, and making the
basic strategic decisions about the presentation of his defense. 184 "If
Milogevi's health problems resurface with sufficient gravity, however, the
presence of Assigned Counsel will enable the trial to continue even if
Milogevi6 is temporarily unable to participate."' 85
It is noteworthy that both the Milogevi6 Trial Chamber and Appeals
Chamber concluded that self-representation was a fundamental (though
qualified) right. In so doing, the Appeals Chamber impliedly overruled the
reasoning of the Trial Chamber in the case of Prosecutor v. gegelj.186 As
discussed above, in ordering that the defendant Vojislav egelj be
represented by "standby counsel" in order to rein in his disruptive behavior,
180 Prosecutor v. Milolevi6, Case No.: IT-02-54-AR73.7, Nov. 1, 2004, at para. 9
("Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment
of Defense Counsel").
181 Id. at para. 13.
182 Id. at para. 15.
183 Id. at paras. 17-18.
184 Id. at para. 19.
185 Id. at para. 20.
186 Prosecutor v. Vojislav egelj, Case No.: IT-03-67-PT, May 9, 2003 ("Decision
on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav tegelj").
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the .ge.elj Trial Chamber had taken the position that ICCPR Article 14(3)(d),
and similar provisions in regional conventions and its own statute do not
declare that the right to work through legal counsel is derivative of the
primary right to represent oneself. As the Segelj Trial Chamber observed: "It
would be a misunderstanding of the word 'or' in the phrase 'to defend
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing' to
conclude that self-representation excludes the appointment of counsel to
assist the Accused or vice versa."187 In contrast, by interpreting the phrase as
creating a presumptive right of self-representation, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber decision is likely to fuel a spate of cases before the European Court
of Human Rights, challenging the practice throughout Europe of requiring
defendants to act through counsel.
It is also significant that both the ICTY Trial Chamber and Appeals
Chamber focused only on Milogevid's health as the source of disruption
justifying restriction on his right of self-representation. Evidently, neither
Chamber felt that his trial antics rose to the level of "substantial and
persistent" disruption that would justify requiring him to act through defense-
counsel. If adopted by other tribunals, the stringent test formulated by the
ICTY Appeals Chamber will make it difficult for judges to maintain decorum
in future war crimes trials. In particular, Saddam Hussein, whose war crimes
trial is set to begin in 2005, would be able to argue that he, too, has a right to
represent himself before the Iraqi Special Tribunal despite his obvious
intentions to use self-representation as a means of undermining the dignity of
the proceedings and disrupting the trial. If Hussein were allowed to follow
Milogevid's playbook-using the unique opportunity of self-representation to
launch daily attacks against the legitimacy of the IST-this would seriously
undermine the goal of fostering reconciliation between the Iraqi Kurds,
Shi'ites and Sunnis; the historic record developed by such a trial would
forever be questioned; and the trial could transform Hussein and his
subordinates into popular martyrs, potentially fueling violent opposition to
the new Iraqi government.
In the final analysis, justice demands that former leaders like Milogevi6
and Hussein be given fair trials. This article has made the case that this can
best be guaranteed by appointing distinguished counsel to defend them, not
by permitting them to act as their own lawyers.
187 Id. at para. 29.
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